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Abstract
Securing data transmission has always been a challenge. While many crypto-
graphic algorithms are available to solve the problem, many applications have tough
area constraints while requiring high-level security. Lightweight cryptography aims
at achieving high-level security with the benefit of being low cost.
Since the late nineties and with the discovery of side channel attacks the approach
towards cryptography has changed quite significantly. An attacker who can get close
to a device can extract sensitive data by monitoring side channels such as power
consumption, sound, or electromagnetic emanation. This means that embedded
implementations of cryptographic schemes require protection against such attacks
to achieve the desired level of security.
In this work we combine a low-cost embedded cipher, Simon, with a state-
of-the-art side channel countermeasure called Threshold Implementation (TI). We
show that TI is a great match for lightweight cryptographic ciphers, especially for
hardware implementation. Our implementation is the smallest TI of a block-cipher
on an FPGA. This implementation utilizes 96 slices of a low-cost Spartan-3 FPGA
and 55 slices a modern Kintex-7 FPGA. Moreover, we present a higher order TI
which is resistant against second order attacks. This implementation utilizes 163
slices of a Spartan-3 FPGA and 95 slices of a Kintex-7 FPGA. We also present a
state of the art leakage analysis and, by applying it to the designs, show that the
implementations achieve the expected security. The implementations even feature
a significant robustness to higher order attacks, where several million observations
are needed to detect leakage.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the past couple of years we have seen numerous small devices got connected
to each other. Some of these devices are not considered to be critical in terms of
security such as light bulb, smart TV and toaster while the others can be critical
such as heart monitoring implants. Based on the application of these devices some
minimum requirement is needed in term of transmitting data securely to servers or
within devices.
The solution for transmitting data securely has been studied for a long time
and cryptography provide us the secure channel. These algorithms work fine if
we assume that the adversary has access only to the data channel. This is not
the case anymore when we talk about small devices which can be found anywhere.
The modern adversary can get close to the device, measure the electromagnetic
emanation of the device. In some cases, an adversary has physical access to the
device and can even connects a wire to that.
Once these assumptions are taken into account those secure algorithms are not
1
secure anymore. An adversary with physical access to the device has the ability
to do the most dangerous type of attacks. Considering these adversaries, having
an implementation of the cryptographic algorithm is not enough and some type of
mitigation against physical attack needs to be applied.
As soon as power analysis attacks were discovered by Kocher et al. in [KJJ99],
effort has been made to propose ways in order to protect the implementation. One
of the first contribution was done by Chari et al. in [CJRR99]. In this work the
author first discusses the behavior of a device and how a device consumes power in
general way. They looked at the CMOS devices and assume that the main source of
power consumption is transition to other states and maintaining the current state
does not need much power. Based on this assumption and also the need for making
the intermediate value independent of key, they introduced splitting the state into
several parts by using some random numbers. This division is done in a way that
combining all the shares will recover the original value and combining all except one
will not reveal any information.
One of the practical implementation using this scheme is done by Akkar et
al. [AG01] for both AES and DES. Later, Oswald et al. [OMPR05] presented a way
to mask the AES S-Box. As it was shown in [MPO05], these two implementations
are vulnerable to more sophisticated attacks. Mangard et el. first show that by
using Hamming weight as a power model they can not successfully recover the key
from the protected design. However, they used the simulation to obtain a new power
model which is basically toggle count for a specific output. They used the mean of
the transition count as their power model and they showed that by doing so, the
implementation is prone to practical attacks. This model works because the delay
in the input of logical gates are not the same for each input. As a result of these
differences in arrival time the output of a circuit will toggle couple of times before
2
it reaches the final result. In a separate work, Mangard et al. [MPG05] show that
the power consumption of a device is correlated to unmasked value in the presence
of glitches.
One of the first efforts to counteract glitches is done by Fischer et al. in [FG05].
The first working solution, on the other hand, is proposed by Nikova et al. in [NRR06].
The idea is based on the secret sharing and it is called Threshold Implementation.
One of the interesting feature of their scheme is the need of randomness only in the
starting point of the algorithm and there is no need for fresh randomness after that.
We are going to introduce this scheme in more details in Section 3.
There are several works published based on the idea of threshold implementation.
Kutzner et al. in [KNP12] shows the implementation of 4-bit S-Boxes using 3 shares.
Another work by Moradi et al. [MPL+11] tries to implement the well-known cipher,
namely AES in a small area. It was shown that the threshold version of AES can be
implemented by using approximately 11000 GE. Bilgin et al. in [BGN+14a] improve
the result even more and implemented threshold implementation of AES using 9000
GE.
Recent works focus on the higher-order threshold implementation. For example,
Bilgin et al. in [BGN+14b] discussed the theory of higher-order threshold imple-
mentation as well as practical implementation. They also presented the resistance
of their core by analyzing 300 million traces and showed that there is no leakage in
those traces.
In this work, to analyze an implementation for leakage, a new methodology will
be used which was proposed by Goodwill et al. in [GJJR11]. This leakage detection
method can be used to observe whether the device leaks or not. An enhancement
to this method is published by Becker et al. in [BCD+13].
3
1.2 Our Contribution
In this work, we chose Simon as a cryptographic algorithm due to its small area
overhead. We focused on one of the existing solution, i.e. threshold implementa-
tion, against an attacker with physical access to the device. We first investigate the
vulnerability of unprotected Simon by presenting an actual attack as well as using
leakage detection methods. As a method for securing Simon against side-channel
attacks, a first order threshold implementation for Simon is proposed and its re-
sistance is also shown by leakage detection method [STE15]. The equation for a
core resistant against second order attacks is also proposed and its efficiency is also
shown by leakage detection method based on actual power traces.
1.3 Outline of the work
In Chapter 2 we start by introducing the background on attacks and ways of pro-
tecting against them. In the same chapter we present a lightweight cipher, namely
Simon in more detail. Then we introduce a mitigation method in Chapter 3. The
protected version of Simon is introduced in Chapter 4. We present our analysis in
Chapter 5 and conclude the work in Chapter 6.
4
Chapter 2
Background
Until around late nineties, the focus of research in cryptography was on proving
that only by observing plaintexts and ciphertexts the key being used by the system
will not be revealed. There has been some interests in breaking the cryptographic
schemes by using some novel ideas such as inducing an error [BDL97] or measuring
the computation time [Koc96]. The seminal work by Kocher et al. [KJJ99] was
among these efforts which shows that by observing the amount of power the device
uses during encryption, useful information can be extracted from the device, such
as when a certain operation is being done. From now on these types of observation
which leads to extraction of useful data are called leakage.
The most important information is the one that depends both on the plaintext
and the key being processed. Using this information can result in obtaining the
key. In order to protect the algorithm against these types of attacks numerous
countermeasures have been proposed. In this section we take a look at how the
attacks work and ways of protecting the device against them.
5
Crypto CorePlaintext Ciphertext
Leakage
Figure 2.1: New Way of Looking at Cryptography
2.1 Side-Channel Attack
As it was stated, the leakage can help the attacker to extract useful information
about the data being processed. As it can be seen in Figure 2.1, the attacker who
has access to the device can simply send his desired plaintext to it.
Then the cryptographic algorithm, which is shown by Crypto Core in the Fig-
ure 2.1, returns the ciphertext by using the plaintext as an input and key as its
secret internal value. The attacker has access to ciphertext and by having physi-
cal access to device he can also perform additional measurement in order to figure
out how the device acts during the run time of the cryptographic algorithm. As it
is also shown in Figure 2.1, there are different kinds of measurement that can be
performed such as measuring the computation time and electromagnetic emanation.
Power consumption is also one type of observation and throughout this thesis we
are going to focus on it as a source of leakage.
As it can be seen in Figure 2.2, resistor R is placed in the route of V CC to
GND. The amount of power that Crypto Device consumes will result in changes of
current going through the device. By simply measuring the voltage Vo and dividing
that value by R that current can be calculated. The power consumption of a device
can be formulated as follows:
6
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Figure 2.2: Power Measurement Setup
Power[Crypto Device] = V cc× Vo
R
(2.1)
The Equation 2.1 shows that the power consumption of a device depends directly
on the Vo. The common setup for measuring power is as it is shown in Figure 2.2.
The oscilloscope (which from now on we refer to it as a scope) records the value of
Vo and we treat that value as a power consumption of a device.
There are two main types of attacks that can be done based on this power
consumption. In the rest of this section we look at both of them.
2.1.1 Simple Power Analysis
In this type of attack it is assumed that the adversary has access to only one measure-
ment or a few measurements. As it is crucial to know exactly what is happening in
each time instance, in order for an attack to be successful, the attacker should know
the details of the implementation. As and example for this type of attack we look
7
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Figure 2.3: Power Consumption of an RSA algorithm
at an algorithm which performs RSA. Figure 2.3 represents the power consumption
of a device which computes an RSA exponentiation using the square-and-multiply
algorithm after filtering noises based on the work by Do et al. [DKH+13]. The
square-and-multiply algorithm performs squaring operation in each steps but mul-
tiplication is only performed when the bit in the exponent is equal to a one bit.
As it can be seen in the figure, the peaks with smaller amplitude happen all the
time. The larger peaks, on the other hand, only happens at some points. From
this observation we can assign the power trace to the exponent. In the points where
only one pick (smaller peaks) happens the bit in the exponent is 0. The other points
which have both smaller and larger peaks can be corresponded to bit 1.
This attack works in this case because the implementation was completely known
to us. This is not always the case.
The power consumption of the first round of AES can be seen in Figure 2.4.
Although the AES algorithm is fully known to us, recovering the key from this
figure, just by looking at it, is not a trivial task.
In the next subsection we introduce Differential Power Analysis (DPA) which
can recover the key even in the scenarios where the details of implementation are
not known to us.
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Figure 2.4: AES Power Consumption
2.1.2 Differential Power Analysis
In this type of attack the adversary does not use the details of the implementation.
For attacking a device using DPA, large number of traces should be recorded. In
contrast to SPA where we look at one trace over time, in a DPA attack statistical
methods will be used to perform the attack. Figure 2.5 shows the steps to perform
DPA attack, we introduce them in the following.
Choosing A Point to Attack DPA attacks can recover the key. The interme-
diate variable that is chosen should depend on a known value (X) and an
unknown key (K). We focus on the AES algorithm in this example. As it can
be seen in Figure 2.6, the chosen point is the output of S-Box layer.
Z = S− Box(Y ) = S− Box(X ⊕K)
Measurement The next step is to run the cryptographic algorithm for a large
number of known plaintexts. In our case we call them d = (d1, d2, . . . , dD).
The Crypto Device will perform encryption on this plaintexts and using the
scope we record the power consumption during this process. The number of
samples in each trace is denoted by T . The samples measured for encryption
9
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di is denoted by si The measured power consumption for input di is then
si = (si,1, si,2, . . . , si,T ).
Simulation In this step we build a matrix based on known input di and key hy-
pothesis kj. Each element of this matrix which is called V is denoted by vi,j
and the equation for obtaining each element is
vi,j = S− Box(di ⊕ kj)
In the real measurement since the key value is fixed, only one column of matrix
V will be recorded. As a result of DPA attack the correct key will be found.
Modeling the Power Consumption Everything up to now was performed either
using simulation or by measuring the actual power consumption, in this step we
try to establish a link between them. The elements of matrix V represents the
value of the intermediate step of the algorithm. In this step, information about
the device is needed to estimate the power consumption of the device based
on these intermediate values. Among the accepted models Hamming distance
and Hamming weight, Least Significant Bit and Most Significant Bit
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can be used. The Hamming distance model is based on how many bits tran-
sition occur from one state to another, while the Hamming weight model just
look at the result and does not care about the transition. In the LSB and
MSB model only the right most and left most bit will take into account, re-
spectively. The elements of this hypothesis matrix H is denoted by hi,j and
they can be derived from vi,j as following
hi,j = Model(vi,j)
As it was mentioned the most common Model functions are Hamming distance,
Hamming weight and LSB or MSB of a register. Based on how accurate this
Model function represents the true behavior of the device, the quality of DPA
attack will differ.
Comparing the Hypothesis Matrix with Actual Traces In this step a statis-
tical tool such as correlation is needed. The goal of this step is twofold. The
first result of doing the comparison will give some information on when the
chosen point is being processed. The second outcome is giving some informa-
tion on the actual key that was used in the Crypto Device.
Here we see an example of a DPA attack on the AES algorithm. The chosen point
is the output of the first S-Box in the first level of AES. The number of traces that
have been recorded is equal to 500 (D = 500), and each trace contains 30,000 points
(T = 30, 000). The matrices V and H are computed by computing the intermediate
result and modeling that intermediate result to hypothesis matrix by using Hamming
weight as power model. The result of correlation-based DPA attack can be seen in
Figure 2.7.
The black trace shows the correct key hypothesis and the rest of them are the
wrong hypothesis. As it can be seen for the correct key, the peaks show the time
12
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Figure 2.7: Result of correlation-based DPA attack on first round of AES
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Figure 2.8: Effect of different power model on correlation value
where the chosen point (in this case, the output of S-Box) is being processed. The
correct key in the figure can be distinguished from the wrong ones, which means
that the chosen power model was successful to describe the real power consumption
of the device.
Figure 2.8 represents the result of DPA attack on the first S-Box by using different
power model. As it can be seen the maximum value of correlation occurred in
Figure 2.8a. This means the Crypto Device that has been attacked is probably
leaking in a way that is close to Hamming weight model.
In the following we are going to look at some countermeasures that, to some
extent, can prevent these type of attacks.
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2.2 Side-Channel Countermeasures
As it was shown in the previous section, the attacks that are based on power analysis
can extract the key from the side-channel leakages. The main reason that those
attacks were successful was because of the fact that the power consumption depends
one the intermediate value being processed. Countermeasures break this link. Since
the introduction of such attacks, countermeasures to prevent them have started to
developed [CJRR99, AG01]. In this section two of those countermeasures have been
discussed.
2.2.1 Hiding
The goal of hiding is to make the power consumption of a device independent of
the intermediate value. Hiding is implemented either through time or the amplitude
domain.
The algorithm can randomly change the time allotted to complete the operation.
This can be done by adding some random delay between two consecutive operations
or change the order of the operations. By adding the random delay to the algorithm,
the time instance where the leakage occurs will change. The attacker can try all
different possible time instances and perform the attack for all of them. The order of
some independent operations can be changed, e.g. S-Box look-up. By changing the
order (also known as shuﬄing) the attack will become harder but not impossible.
There are other ways to hide the power consumption which modify the amplitude.
In hardware, a natural way to achieve this is to perform several operations in
parallel. Another way is to add a separate unit to the circuit to generate additional
noise.
Another way to perform hiding is to design a circuit which consumes same
14
amount of power all the time. The idea is to add a parallel logic to the circuit
which processes the complement of the original data. If all the operands can be re-
alized using this encoding the circuit will consume constant power all the time. One
of the recent work is done by Cong et al. [CESY14]. In their paper they proposed to
use a special encoding for data that keeps the complement value of the data inside
the encoded value. They showed that by using this scheme they can reduce the
correlation coefficient of the DPA attack.
All the countermeasures proposed in this section will make the attack harder but
an adversary can break the algorithm with sufficiently many traces.
2.2.2 Masking
Another class of countermeasures is masking, which processes completely random
values, created from the original values by adding random masks, during the al-
gorithm and at the end combines them in a way that the correct result can be
recovered [CJRR99].
Lets assume the secret value is x and some random number m is also available.
From now on m will be called mask value. Masking can be applied both at the gate
level and at the algorithm level. Gate level masking is more generic and can be
applied to every new algorithm. On the other hand, the algorithmic level masking
needs to be redesigned for new ciphers. In this work we focus on masking schemes
that will be applied at the algorithm level.
There are two types of masking schemes, arithmetic masking and Boolean mask-
ing. In arithmetic masking the operation to create the random value is performed by
doing either modular addition or modular multiplication. In this work, the indepen-
dent values are obtained by XORing the secret with random mask which is a Boolean
masking. The circuit will process x⊕m and m in parallel and independently. At the
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end the result of both circuit will be combined. The masking scheme can combine
the original data and the mask in different ways such as addition, multiplication
and modular addition (such as XOR). In the following we discuss how the masking
based on addition modulo two (XOR) works.
Lets assume that the data to be processed is x and y and the masks generated
for them are mx and my, respectively. Secret value x and y will be divided into two
shares as follows
x will become {xm,mx} xm = x⊕mx
y will become {ym,my} ym = y ⊕my
The different types of operation can be realized as following.
Linear Operation For performing such an operation, it is enough to do the same
computation on each share separately. Lets assume the linear operation is L
L(x) = L(xm ⊕mx) = L(xm)⊕ L(mx)
L(x, y) = L(xm ⊕mx, ym ⊕my) = L(xm, ym)⊕ L(mx,my)
From the above equations it is shown that the operation can be done on each
share separately and the final result of the operation is XOR of the result of
each share.
Non-linear Operation The only non-linear operation in modulo 2 is AND and the
steps to perform the masked version of AND is as follows which is based on the
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work by Trichina et al. [TKL05].
NL(x, y) = x⊗ y = (xm ⊕mx)⊗ (ym ⊕my)
= (xm ⊗ ym)⊕ (xm ⊗my)⊕ (mx ⊗ ym)⊕ (mx ⊗my)
In order to use the result of the multiplication in the next stage of the circuit
a mask should be added to the above equation. We denote this mask with mz
and then the output masking of the multiplication becomes
z will become {zm,mz} zm = (x⊗ y)⊕mz
Figure 2.9 shows the implementation of such a circuit.
The masking algorithm explained above works under one condition and that is the
necessity that all the input to the circuit arrives at exactly the same time. In
hardware ensuring such a condition is not possible. Every input to the masked AND
comes from different part of the circuit and the delay of each path is different. Even
if we assume that all inputs are coming at the same time, there might be some delay
added by the circuits inside the gates.
The different arrival time for the circuit causes the output to toggle a couple of
times before reaching the final result. This effect is called glitches. Mangard et al.
in [MPG05] showed that a masked implementation of AND gate is not secure against
DPA attacks. In another work, Mangard et al. [MPO05] successfully attacked the
masked version of AES. They built a power model based on the simulation of back-
annotated netlist of their design. The power model was obtained by counting the
number of transition in the simulation also known as toggle count model. The
number of transition depends on the input of the circuit, even if the input is masked.
17
mX
mY
mX
Ym
Xm
mY
Xm
Ym
mz
Z
Figure 2.9: Masked AND gate
Finally, they showed the possibility of attacking the masked version of AES in the
presence of glitches. This type of attacks motivates us to look at the other masking
schemes which can withstand glitches. This type of countermeasures is introduced
in Section 3.
2.3 Simon
Classical ciphers were designed with having the confidentiality of the plaintext given
only the ciphertext in mind. Recently some small ciphers, also known as lightweight
cryptographic ciphers, have been proposed for embedded systems. These lightweight
solutions were designed for environments where the area is a limitation. Simon and
Speck are two ciphers that have been recently proposed by NSA [BSS+13, BSS+15]
and it is shown that their implementation is low-cost. These two lightweight ciphers
accepts different types of plaintext and key as an input. The block size can be 32,
48, 64, 96 and 128 bits. For each input size, they have a set of allowable key sizes
ranging from 64 bits to 256 bits. In this chapter we look at Simon in more detail.
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Simon is designed to be efficient in hardware. Simon will be denoted as Si-
mon2n/mn in which 2n shows the size of input block and mn is the size of key.
For performing key schedule the input key will be divided into m blocks of size n
bits each. For example Simon96/144 denotes a cipher with 96 bits plaintext which
accepts keys of size 144 bits and for performing key schedule the key will be divided
into 3 blocks with size of 48 bits. Simon has Feistel network structure which can be
implemented efficiently in hardware. Each round of Simon has simple operations,
namely, bitwise XOR and bitwise AND and also circular shifts which is simply done
by proper wiring. Based on the requirements imposed on the designer, different
configuration for Simon can be selected. Table 2.1 represents those configurations.
In the following we discuss in details how each part of the cipher works.
Plaintext Key Key Rounds Rounds
Size (bits) Size (bits) Words (m) Constant (T )
32 64 4 z0 32
48
72 3 z0 36
96 4 z1 36
64
96 3 z2 42
128 4 z3 44
96
96 2 z2 52
144 3 z3 54
128
128 2 z2 68
192 3 z3 69
256 4 z4 72
Table 2.1: Parameters for Simon
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2.3.1 Round Function
As it can be seen in Figure 2.10, the plaintext will be divided into two parts each
consists of n bits. The structure is basically a Feistel network. The round function
G which maps the input state to output state can be written as follows.
G(L,R) = (F (L, ki)⊕R,L) (2.2)
Function F consists of shifting the input to the left by 1,2 and 8 positions which
are shown as S1(.), S2(.) and S8(.), respectively. It also has AND and also XOR with
the round key. Function F can be represented as follows.
F (L, ki) =
(
S(L)⊗ S8(L)
)
⊕ S2(L)⊕ ki (2.3)
All rounds of Simon are the same with only difference that round keys will be
different in each stage. It is worth noticing that Simon uses basic logic elements and
shifting can also be handled by wiring. The two mentioned properties made Simon
to be highly efficient in hardware. Low area design for Simon can be achieved easily
because first of all logic gates in the design are simple and second because round
functions can be used for all the stages. In the following we will look at the key
schedule of Simon.
2.3.2 Key Schedule
Based on Table 2.1 the proper setting for key schedule can be extracted. Once the
number of key blocks is known, the key schedule will be done based on either one of
the Figure 2.11a, 2.11b or 2.12 if the number of key blocks is 2,3 or 4, respectively.
The key schedule consists of shifting, XOR with key and also with constant. The
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Figure 2.10: Simon round function
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(b) Simon key schedule (3 blocks)
Figure 2.11: Simon key schedule (2 and 3 blocks)
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circular shift is to the right, in contrast to round functions in which the rotations
were to the left. In each round the result will be XORed with a both constant value.
Constant c is equal to 2n − 4 = 0xff...fc, and it is the same for all rounds. The
other constant value is zj which is chosen based on Table 2.1.
Constant Sequence In order to obtain constant sequence zjs for j = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}
we do the followings. The matrices U , V and W are defined as below
U =

0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1

, V =

0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0

,W =

0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0

Three sequences u, v and w are defined as below, where (u)i denotes the bit
at position ith of the sequence u. All of these sequences has period of 31, so
it is enough to compute the first 31 bits. In the following the first 62 bits of
those sequences are shown in hexadecimal notation.
(u)i = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1)U
i(0, 0, 0, 0, 1)T , u0u1u2 . . . u61 = 3E8958737D12B0E6
(v)i = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1)V
i(0, 0, 0, 0, 1)T , v0v1v2 . . . v61 = 23BE4C2D477C985A
(w)i = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1)W
i(0, 0, 0, 0, 1)T , w0w1w2 . . . w61 = 212CF8DD4259F1BA
Let t denotes the sequence of 0s and 1s with period of 2, i.e. t = t0t1t2 . . . =
010101 . . .. The first 62 bits of each constant sequence zj is as follows, z0 and
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Figure 2.12: Simon key schedule (4 blocks)
z1 have the period of 31 the rest has the period of 62.
(z0)i = (u)i , z0 = 3E8958737D12B0E6 . . .
(z1)i = (v)i , z1 = 212CF8DD4259F1BA . . .
(z2)i = (t)i ⊕ (u)i , z2 = 2BDC0D262847E5B3 . . .
(z3)i = (t)i ⊕ (v)i , z3 = 36EB19781229CD0F . . .
(z4)i = (t)i ⊕ (w)i , z4 = 3479AD88170CA4EF . . .
Then the equations for computing the round keys are as follows for each case
ki+m =

c⊕ (zj)i ⊕ ki ⊕ S−3(ki+1)⊕ S−4(ki+1) if m = 2
c⊕ (zj)i ⊕ ki ⊕ S−3(ki+2)⊕ S−4(ki+2) if m = 3
c⊕ (zj)i ⊕ ki ⊕ S−3(ki+3)⊕ S−4(ki+3)⊕ S−1(ki+1)⊕ ki+1 if m = 4
The above algorithm will be done for 0 ≤ i < T −m. The result of the key schedule
will be used in the round function. The first m levels in round function is done by
using the input key and the rest of the Simon will use the keys computed by key
schedule unit.
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Chapter 3
Glitch-Free Implementations
The masking scheme which was introduced in the previous chapter can not resist
DPA attacks, because the glitches have not been taken into account. In this chapter
we introduce threshold implementation which is type of masking provably secure
against first order DPA attacks, even in the presence of glitches. Threshold Imple-
mentation countermeasure was proposed by Nikova et al. in [NRR06].
3.1 Threshold Implementation
Threshold implementation is an (n, d) secret sharing in which d is equal to n, or all
the shares are required to construct the secret value. The secret value is denoted by
X and its shares are represented by X1, . . . , Xn which is represented by Xˆ. The set
of n − 1 shares which is missing Xi is denoted by Xˆi. Share generation function is
a simple XOR, and it can be realized as follows:
Definition 1 (share generation) For dividing secret X into n shares, n−1 random
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Figure 3.1: Simple function
value Mi will be generated and the shares are Xi = Mi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1Xn = (∑n−1i=1 Mi)⊕X
In this section we only focus on the functions with only one output. Furthermore,
assume function f consists of two input value X and Y and produces Z as an output,
e.g., Z = f(X, Y ) and it can be seen in Figure 3.1.
The shared version of output Z is denoted as Zˆ = (Z1, . . . , Zn). As it can be
seen in Figure 3.2 each output share Zi is produced by new function called fi. The
input to each function fi comes from some input shares Xi and Yi. The selection of
the input shares is discussed in the rest of this section especially in 3.1.2 and 3.1.3.
The next part of this section is dedicated to necessary properties for constructing
a threshold implementation of a function. These properties are called Correctness,
Non-completeness and Uniformity.
3.1.1 Correctness
We have seen that output value is divided into n shares. Correctness means that
by combining those output shares the original output can be retrieved in a correct
way. In other word as it can be seen in Figure 3.2
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Figure 3.2: Simple function broken into shares
X =
⊕n
i=1Xi = X1 ⊕X2 ⊕ . . . Xn
Y =
⊕n
i=1 Yi = Y1 ⊕ Y2 ⊕ . . . Yn
Z =
⊕n
i=1 Zi = Z1 ⊕ Z2 ⊕ . . . Zn
3.1.2 Non-completeness
Non-completeness means that the equation used to evaluate any output share should
be missing at least one input share. This requirement enforces that the information
required to compute the secret value (all the shares) is not present in the system at
any time instance. Hence, any vulnerability in the implementation (e.g. glitches)
cannot leak the secret key. This property can be simply achieved if function f is
linear. We assume that the wiring in the Figure 3.2 is in a way that Zi = fi(Xi, Yi),
it can be shown that this wiring has non-completeness (each function depends on
only one input share) and correctness.
Z =
n⊕
i=1
Zi =
n⊕
i=1
fi(Xi, Yi) = f(
n⊕
i=1
Xi,
n⊕
i=1
Yi) = f(X, Y )
26
In case function f is non-linear the wiring should be done in a different way. Lets
assume that function f is a simple multiplication and each input and output shares
are divided into three shares. One possible way of doing the wiring is to rewrite the
equations in a way that function fi depends on Xˆi and Yˆi
f(X, Y ) = XY = (X1 ⊕X2 ⊕X3)(Y1 ⊕ Y2 ⊕ Y3)
= X1Y1 ⊕X1Y2 ⊕X1Y3
+X2Y1 ⊕X2Y2 ⊕X2Y3
+X3Y1 ⊕X3Y2 ⊕X3Y3
Then the output shares are written as
Z1 = X2Y3 ⊕X3Y2 ⊕X2Y2
Z2 = X3Y1 ⊕X1Y3 ⊕X3Y3
Z3 = X1Y2 ⊕X2Y1 ⊕X1Y1
It is obvious to see that each Zi is missing Xi and Yi component and also combining
all Zi will results in the correct output, i.e., XY .
Obviously, because of non-completeness property the attacker who has access to
the output of one of the fis can not infer anything about the input shares.
Nikova et al. [NRR06] proved that if the Equation 3.1 holds and two mentioned
properties are satisfied, all the intermediate results of the circuit will be independent
of inputs (X,Y ) and output (Z). This equation ensures that for any input (x, y) all
the valid sharing (Xˆ, Yˆ ) will happen with equal probability.
Pr(Xˆ = xˆ, Yˆ = yˆ) = αPr(X = x, Y = y) α is a constant value (3.1)
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of output shares when multiplication function is imple-
mented using three shares
These two properties are basic requirements for having threshold implementation.
In practice the functions we are interested in are complex functions with so several
levels. As the depth of the function grows there is a need for more shares. It is going
to be impractical to implement those functions just by having a combinational logic.
It was mentioned before that glitches occur due to difference in arrival time of each
input of a logic gate and also random delay inside a logic gate. If we assume that
an element can isolate its input timing and output timing we can break complex
designs into pieces. This element which can isolate its input and output timing,
as a result block the propagation of glitches, is called register. Our design can be
simply turned into pipeline. In each stage of pipeline a simple functionality will
be performed. In order for this design to be threshold implementation the input of
each pipeline stage must satisfy the Equation 3.1. The input of each pipeline stage
is the output of the previous stage. The next property is defined so that the output
shares satisfy Equation 3.1.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of output shares when multiplication function is imple-
mented using three shares with extra randomness added to the equations
3.1.3 Uniformity
If the input shares are uniformly distributed, the output shares must also be uni-
formly distributed.
Pr(Zˆ = zˆ|Z = z) = β β is a constant value (3.2)
It can be shown that the multiplication introduced in Section 3.1.2 with uniformly
distributed inputs does not satisfy the uniformity properties for the output. We
did the analysis and as it can be seen in the Figure 3.3 the distribution of the
output shares is not uniform. The x-axis in the figure denotes the number Z1Z2Z3
in decimal notation.
In order to achieve the uniform distribution two approaches can be pursued.
The first one is to add a new randomness to the set of previous shares in order
to make them look random [MPL+11, BGN+14a]. The second approach is to in-
crease the number of share and try to find a solution that satisfy all the mentioned
properties [NRR06].
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of output shares when multiplication function is imple-
mented using four shares
Adding New Randomness In order to add new randomness we can add three
new random values to each equation, namely R1, R2 and R3. The Ris are
independently and uniformly distributed random variable. In order to satisfy
the correctness property the final result of Z1⊕Z2⊕Z3 should kept unchanged.
As a result adding these random numbers should not have effect on the result
or in other word R1⊕R2⊕R3 = 0. The set of new equations are shown below.
Z1 = X2Y3 ⊕X3Y2 ⊕X2Y2 ⊕R1
Z2 = X3Y1 ⊕X1Y3 ⊕X3Y3 ⊕R2
Z3 = X1Y2 ⊕X2Y1 ⊕X1Y1 ⊕R3
and the distribution of output shares can be seen in Figure 3.4.
Increase The Number of Shares Nikova et al. in [NRR06] chose the second
approach and proposed a new set of equations for constructing the output
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shares.
Z1 = (X3 ⊕X4)(Y2 ⊕ Y3)⊕ Y2 ⊕ Y3 ⊕ Y4 ⊕X2 ⊕X3 ⊕X4
Z2 = (X1 ⊕X3)(Y1 ⊕ Y4)⊕ Y1 ⊕ Y3 ⊕ Y4 ⊕X1 ⊕X3 ⊕X4
Z3 = (X2 ⊕X4)(Y1 ⊕ Y4)⊕ Y2 ⊕X2
Z4 = (X1 ⊕X2)(Y2 ⊕ Y3)⊕ Y1 ⊕X1
The analysis for this set of equations can be seen in Figure 3.5. Comparing
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.5 proves that using the new of equations will result in
the Uniform property to hold true and the construction based on this scheme
is threshold implementation and glitch free.
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Chapter 4
Design Methodology
Before starting the design, the designer should clearly specify the goals of the design.
Being the fastest design or being the smallest design are examples of those goals.
In this chapter we introduce the smallest implementation of Simon which only
processes one bit at each cycle and apply the threshold implementation idea to
that.
4.1 Bit-Serial Architecture of SIMON
As we have already seen in Section 2.3, Simon is a block cipher based on the Feistel
structure. Simon accepts plaintexts of size 32, 48, 64, 96 and 128 bits. For each
input size, Simon has a set of allowable key sizes ranging from 64 bits to 256 bits.
The input is evenly split into two words, following the principles of Feistel structure.
The key is also split into two to four words. The input key words which are used
in the first rounds of Simon. The key scheduling algorithm is used to generate the
following round keys. The number of rounds in Simon ranges from 32 rounds to 72
rounds. We focus on the Simon128/128 which which has 68 rounds and the input
key will be divided into 2 blocks each one contains 64 bits.
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The Equations 2.2 and 2.3 shows the round function. Assuming that the input
words of round i are li and ri, the output words are:
li+1 = ri ⊕ l2i ⊕ (l1i ∧ l8i )⊕ ki ri+1 = li
The upper index Xs indicates left circular shift by s bits. This can be expressed in
GF(2), where the XOR operation becomes addition and the AND operation becomes
multiplication, as:
li+1 = ri + l
2
i + (l
1
i × l8i ) + ki ri+1 = li (4.1)
Also, assuming that the input words of the key, which are also the first round
keys, are k0 and k1 (and possibly k2 and k3, depending on the key size), the next
round key is computed as:
ki+2 = ki + k
−3
i+1 + k
−4
i+1 + αi Two and Three Words
ki+4 = ki + ki+1 + k
−1
i+1 + k
−3
i+3 + k
−4
i+3 + αi Four Words
(4.2)
where αi is a the bitwise XOR of constant c and constant sequence (zj)i as it was
introduced in Section 2.3.2.
Aysu et al. in [AGS14] proposed a bit-serialized implementation of Simon where
only one bit of the internal state is processed in each clock cycle. Hence, a single
round of Simon completes after n cycles, where 2n is the size of input plaintext.
Moreover, two shift registers were used to store the internal states to simplify
the control of sequentially processing and storing individual bits. In fact, the left
share of the internal state is passed over as-is to the right share, hence only one shift
register of the same size as the input block is actually needed.
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Figure 4.1: Data-path of the Simon cipher
Here, Simon is implemented as a special class of non-linear feedback shift reg-
isters, where the output of the feedback function changes the state only after com-
pleting the round function. Since the feedback function requires only four bits of
the state, namely ri, l
1
i , l
2
i and l
8
i , only those bits need to be stored. This storage
is realized by an extra 8-bit shift register. An overview of this implementation is
shown in Figure 4.1.
One of the main reason for using such a scheme for round function is the efficiency
in area usage. As it can be seen in Figure 4.1, the basic elements used in the
structure are shift registers which can simply goes into one slice of FPGA. The
computation unit, i.e., LUT can also be mapped to one LUT of each slices. Shift
Register Up (SRU) and Shift Register Down (SRD) can also be mapped into several
slices. Although they are also simple shift registers, the fact that some internal
registers needed for LUT make those logic spread to several slices.
4.1.1 Round Function
At first, the input is loaded into the Shift Register Up (SRU), FIFO1 and FIFO2.
As it can be seen in Figure 4.2a, during the first 8 cycles, the look-up table (LUT)
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Figure 4.2: Data flow in even rounds of Simon where SRD is used for saving newly
computed data
processes three bits from the SRU, a key bit and the output of FIFO2. It basically
computes the result of Equation 4.1. The result is stored in the Shift Register Down
(SRD). During this phase, SRD stores the new values, while SRU stores the old ones
for further processing.
Once the SRD is full and before overflowing occurs, instead of SRU, SRD will be
connected to FIFO1, where the new values will be stored. This change can be seen
in Figure 4.2b. SRU will still work as the old register for storing old bit values from
FIFO1 output. This phase continues for 56 cycles until the round is completed. As
it can be seen, at the end of this round the state to be processed in the next round
is stored in SRD, FIFO1 and FIFO2. Since the input for the LUT unit should come
from SRD instead of SRU, there is a need for change in the data flow.
As it was mentioned, in the next round, the functionality of SRU and SRD will
be flipped. It can be seen in the Figure 4.3a that in the first 8 clock cycles, SRU will
be used to store new values while SRD holds the necessary values needed for further
computations. Once SRU is filled with new values its output will be connected to
FIFO1. As it is represented in Figure 4.3b at this point the new values will be
written into FIFO1 and SRD will keep holding the values for computation.
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Figure 4.3: Data flow in odd rounds of Simon where SRU is used for saving newly
computed data
4.1.2 Key Schedule
The structure of the key schedule is shown in Figure 4.4. The key will be loaded
into Shifter1, FIFO and Shifter2. The output of Shifter2 is the key that will be used
in each round of Simon. The key that will be used in the first two rounds are the
key loaded into in the first step and the key for the next rounds can be computed
according to Equation 4.2.
During the first 4 clock cycles the output of LUT will be loaded into Shift Register
(SR) and the data in FIFO will be moved to both Shifter2 and Shifter1. Once the
SR is full it will save the data inside and the rest of the computed result of LUT
will be moved to Shifter1 and FIFO will continue to move its data to Shifter2. This
will keep going for the next 60 clock cycles and the first round of key schedule will
be done.
From now on the input to LUT will be either from SR for the first clock cycle
of each round and from FIFO for the next 63 clock cycles. During the first 4 clock
cycles the output of SR will moved to both Shifter2 and Shifter1 and the result of
LUT will moved to SR. Once SR is full it will stop shifting data and FIFO will fill
Shifter2 and the result of LUT will move to Shifter1.
In each step constant is calculated by Equation 4.2 and the materials covered in
Section 2.3.2.
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Figure 4.4: Key schedule of the Simon cipher
4.2 Loop Unrolling
The idea of loop unrolling first published in a work by Bhasin et al. [BGSD10]. They
proposed a method to compute the result of DES algorithm in only one clock cycle.
They showed that their implementation resist the correlation power analysis on
Hamming distance and Hamming weight model if the datapath get cleared after each
DES evaluation. Beaulieu et al. also proposed in [Smi15] to use the same method for
protecting Simon against side-channel attacks. They implemented Simon in a way
that computes four full rounds per clock cycle. Moradi et al. showed a correlation
collision attacks on four unrolled encryption rounds of AES in [MMP11]. Since this
method is not proven to be secure, in Section 5.1.1 we just present a practical attack
on the four unrolled encryption rounds of Simon32/64.
4.3 Threshold Implementation of SIMON
Threshold Implementation of block ciphers have been published for AES [MPL+11,
BGN+14a] and Present [KNPW13].
In this work, we propose the required equations to process Simon as a threshold
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implementation. Although a three shares implementation is required to overcome
glitches in hardware modules, we start with a two shares implementation as a pre-
liminary step.
4.3.1 Simon with Two Shares
In order to process Simon in two shares, we use the following equations. We denote
the random mask that affects the input plaintext as m1 and m2. The input words
are given as:
(r1)0 = m1 (r2)0 = m1 + r0
(l1)0 = m2 (l2)0 = m2 + l0
(4.3)
Then, the round functions can be expressed as:
(r1)i+1 = (l1)i (r2)i+1 = (l2)i
(l1)i+1 = (r1)i + (l1)
2
i + (l1)
1
i × (l1)8i + (l1)1i × (l2)8i + (k1)i
(l2)i+1 = (r2)i + (l2)
2
i + (l2)
1
i × (l2)8i + (l2)1i × (l1)8i + (k2)i
(4.4)
where k1 and k2 are the two shares of the round key. We use a different mask to
process the key schedule. The size of the mask should be equal to the size of the
key. Equations for splitting the key schedule into two shares are straightforward,
being an entirely linear operation. It is just enough to split the key at the first step
into to shares and run the key schedule on each of them separately.
This masking scheme is correct and uniform. However, it is not non-complete
because the two input shares are required to process any output share. This masking
scheme can work in software implementations if we enforce the order of processing
the equation to be from left to right. Hence, we ensure that the compiler does not
generate any intermediate variable that is free from the random mask. However, this
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masking scheme is not provably secure in hardware implementations where glitches
can leak the relation between the two shares. In order for the secret-sharing scheme
to provably work in hardware implementations, we need to enforce the requirement
of non-completeness. Hence, we propose the three-sharing scheme in the next sub-
section.
4.3.2 Simon with Three Shares
The equations used to process Simon in three shares follow the same reasoning of
the two shares. Here, we use two random variables, each with the same size as the
input plaintext. This generates three shares of each word, denoted by x1, x2 and
x3. The equations to process the r and l part are as follows:
(r1)i+1 = (l1)i (r2)i+1 = (l2)i (r3)i+1 = (l3)i (4.5)
(l1)i+1 = (r2 + l
2
2 + l
1
2 × l82 + l12 × l83 + l13 × l82 + k2)i
(l2)i+1 = (r3 + l
2
3 + l
1
3 × l83 + l13 × l81 + l11 × l83 + k3)i
(l3)i+1 = (r1 + l
2
1 + l
1
1 × l81 + l11 × l82 + l12 × l81 + k1)i
(4.6)
This masking scheme is correct, uniform and non-complete. It is non-complete
because the equation used to process any output share (e.g. 1) does not include
at least one input share (1). Although the system of equations in the data-path
(every term in the equations aside from the key) is not invertible, i.e., its mapping
is not guaranteed to be one-to-one, which suggests non-uniformity, uniformity is
guaranteed by the randomness brought by the key shares (k1, k2 and k3). The key
shares are uniformly distributed as the system of equations to generate them is
linear and invertible (assuming that the input random masks are uniform). Then, it
is easy to prove that the result of addition in GF(2) between an arbitrary variable
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that is not necessarily uniform (the data-path) and a uniformly distributed random
variable (the key shares), is uniformly distributed. This implies that the above
system of equations is uniform. The distribution of the output shares of the above
equations are demonstrated in Figure 3.4. Although the random variable used in
one round depends on the random variables used in the previous rounds, this does
not result in any vulnerability for univariate attacks that harvest information from
a single point in the trace.
The number of randomness used in our design comes from the randomness in
datapath and the randomness in key schedule. As we divided the plaintext into
three shares we need two random mask each one being 128 bits. The same idea
holds for key schedule where we need 256 bits random data in total. As a result,
for threshold implementation of Simon there is a need for 512 bits randomness
which is smaller than the previous works by Moradi et al. [MPL+11] and Bilgin et
al. [BGN+14a] which uses 7680 and 7040 bits, respectively.
In order to design a threshold implementation for Simon there are two choices,
parallel and serial. In both cases the state will be divided into three shares.
4.3.3 Parallel Simon
The parallel implementation uses three copies of the data-path and key schedule
units, i.e. one for each share. Note that the three datapath units and key schedule
units need only one instance of the control unit. Throughout this section we use
f(s, k) to denote the modular addition between key bit k and state bit s, i.e.,
f(s, k) = s+ k. The state bit and key bit are as follows:
s = rα + l
2
α + l
1
α × l8α + l1α × l8β + l1β × l8α
k = kα
(4.7)
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where α and β denote different input shares.
The r part of each share can be easily obtained by shifting the l part of that
share. For computing the l part the Equation 4.7 should be satisfied. As can be
seen in Figure 4.5, the input to the function block comes from two shares (denoted
by old) based on the above equation along with one bit from the key. The output is
written into one share (denoted by new). The function block is implemented using
LUTs. The old share is SRU (or SRD) and the new share is SRD (SRU), if the
round is even (odd). The parameters α and β can be extracted from Equations 4.6.
At each clock cycle the key schedule unit and data-path unit are enabled to ensure
that new values are written for all three shares at each clock cycle.
In order to ensure that each output share is independent of at least one input
share the “Keep Hierarchy” property of synthesize tool should be enabled. The keep
hierarchy property ensures that parallel LUTs are synthesized so that they never
share in one slice. The resistance analysis presented in the next section shows that
this level of separation is sufficient for security.
Although no component of this core receives all three shares as an input, hence
preventing glitches from leaking first-order information, the core as a whole still pro-
cesses all three shares in the same clock cycle. Under rare circumstances, this might
result in remaining first order leakage. For this reason, we propose the serialized
version of the protected core where each share is strictly accessed in different clock
cycles.
4.3.4 Serial Simon
The serial Simon processes only one share at each clock cycle as opposed to parallel
implementation. More specifically, in each clock cycle, only one bit is computed
and only one register is being shifted. So, updating the three shares takes three
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Figure 4.5: Architecture of parallel Simon where all three shares are being processed
at the same clock cycle
clock cycles. To ensure the correctness of the design, Read After Write (RAW)
hazard should be prevented. This requires one extra register, added to one of the
shares to save the previous value of that share. In order to reduce the overhead
caused by the mentioned register, we modify the non-completeness of the equations
in Section 4.3.2, such that shares 1, 2 and 3 are independent of shares 3, 1 and 2,
respectively. The equation for this core is as follows:
(r1)i+1 = (l1)i (r2)i+1 = (l2)i (r3)i+1 = (l3)i (4.8)
(l1)i+1 = (r1 + l
2
1 + l
1
1 × l81 + l11 × l82 + l12 × l81 + k1)i
(l2)i+1 = (r2 + l
2
2 + l
1
2 × l82 + l12 × l83 + l13 × l82 + k2)i
(l3)i+1 = (r3 + l
2
3 + l
1
3 × l83 + l13 × l81 + l11 × l83 + k3)i
(4.9)
Based on the new set of equations, only share 1 will face the RAW hazard, so the
extra register is added for share 1. Figure 4.6 illustrates the new architecture. Since
the design is based on shift registers, adding an extra register is achieved by taking
one register out of FIFO1 and adding it to SRU and SRD. The design ensures that
at each cycle only one key bit along with proper states will go through the MUX.
The computed result will then be routed in the DEMUX unit and written into the
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Figure 4.6: Architecture of Serial Simon where only one share is being processed at
each clock cycle
proper share.
4.4 Higher-Order Threshold Implementation of Si-
mon
The implementations which were just introduced will resist against first order attacks
but they are not resistant against higher order attacks. The set of equations for
satisfying a design which withstand higher order attacks are more complex. The
non-completeness property should be modified. Bilgin et al. [BGN+14b] proposed
the following property as non-completeness. We should remember that in threshold
implementation theory the original function f will be divided into n portions fi and
each one of them get some shares from the input.
Property dth-order non-completeness. Any combination of up to d output of fi
must be independent of at least one input share.
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Bilgin et al. showed that the dth statistical moment of the power consumption of
a device which satisfies the above property is independent of the unmasked input
even in the occurrence of glitches.
For example, assume the function is f(a, b, c) = a + b × c. The sharing of a, b
and c will be denoted as ai, bi and ci, respectively. One possible set of equations to
satisfy the above property is as follows:
y1 = a2 + b2c2 + b1c2 + b2c1 y2 = a3 + b3c3 + b1c3 + b3c1
y3 = a4 + b4c4 + b1c4 + b4c1 y4 = a1 + b1c1 + b1c5 + b5c1
y5 = a5 + b5c5 + b2c5 + b5c2
y6 = b2c4 + b4c2 y7 = b2c3 + b3c2
y8 = b3c4 + b3c5 + b4c5 y9 = b4c3 + b5c3 + b5c4
(4.10)
In this equation the number of input shares is 5, while the number of output shares
is 9. By keeping the sharing of yi, the design will get bigger as more non-linear
function is to be computed. Hence, there is a need for decreasing the number of
shares. It was shown in [BGN+14b] that the following construction which combines
yis is still secure against d
th-order DPA attack.
z1 = y1 + y6 z2 = y2 + y7
z3 = y3 + y8 z4 = y4 + y9
z5 = y5
(4.11)
The logic where computes yi should be separated from the unit which computes the
zi by registers.
Consider the case of Simon. The equation for computing the left part is shown
in Equation 4.1. The l part and r part of the equation are coming from the round
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functions and they should have the same number of shares. The key, on the other
hand, can be divided into different number of shares. As long as the correctness
property and dth-order non-completeness holds it can be added to the same set of
equations. The equations for processing the round function is as follows:
y1 = (r2 + l
1
2 × l82 + l11 × l82 + l12 × l81)i
y2 = (r3 + l
1
3 × l83 + l11 × l83 + l13 × l81)i
y3 = (r4 + l
1
4 × l84 + l11 × l84 + l14 × l81)i
y4 = (r1 + l
1
1 × l81 + l11 × l85 + l15 × l81)i
y5 = (r5 + l
1
5 × l85 + l12 × l85 + l15 × l82)i
y6 = (l
1
2 × l84 + l14 × l82 + k1)i
y7 = (l
1
2 × l83 + l13 × l82 + k2)i
y8 = (l
1
3 × l84 + l13 × l85 + l14 × l85)i
y9 = (l
1
4 × l83 + l15 × l83 + l15 × l84 + k3)i
(4.12)
After computing the yis, the result will be stored in a register. In the next clock
cycle, the stored values will be read from the registers and mixed together to reduce
the sharing to 5 shares. The last part of the Equation 4.1, which is (l2)i will be
added too. Since there is one clock cycle difference the actual value for (l2)i is shifted
and now is present at (l3)i. The architecture of the design will slightly change to be
able to read that value as well.
z1 = y1 + y6 + (l
3
1)i z2 = y2 + y7 + (l
3
2)i
z3 = y3 + y8 + (l
3
3)i z4 = y4 + y9 + (l
3
4)i
z5 = y5 + (l
3
5)i
(4.13)
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The amount of randomness in this core comes from the randomness needed in
datapath as well as key schedule. Since we divided the plaintext into five shares we
need four random mask each one being 128 bits. The key schedule, on the other
hand, will be divided into three shares so 256 bits of randomness will be used in
key schedule unit. In total, for higher order threshold implementation of Simon
there is a need for 768 bits randomness which is still smaller than the works by
Moradi et al. [MPL+11] and Bilgin et al. [BGN+14a] which uses 7680 and 7040 bits,
respectively.
4.5 Implementation Results
The proposed designs were implemented in Verilog HDL and synthesized using ISE
14.7. Table 4.1 represents the implementation result of the unprotected, threshold
implementation and higher order threshold implementation when it is synthesized for
Spartan-3 xc3s50. The first row for each mode of Simon represent the unprotected
core. The second row shows the result for the threshold implementation of Simon
and the third row shows the result for the higher order threshold implementation of
Simon.
Table 4.2 represents the implementation result of the unprotected, threshold
implementation and higher order threshold implementation when it is synthesized for
Kintex-7 xc7k70t. The first row for each mode of Simon represent the unprotected
core. The second row shows the result for the threshold implementation of Simon
and the third row shows the result for the higher order threshold implementation of
Simon.
Table 4.3 summarizes the results and provides a comparison to previous imple-
mentations on the same platform. Our proposed parallel implementation needs 96
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slices when synthesized by setting the optimization goal to area. The occupied slices
are less than three times of the unprotected design, since the control logic is not
replicated for the parallel design. We also synthesized the parallel design by choosing
speed as the main optimization goal, letting synthesize tool pick slices. The serial
design is slightly larger than the parallel one, because of the overhead in control
logic and some minor changes in the data-path, as discussed before. As highlighted
in Table 4.3, our implementation is more compact than some unprotected ciphers,
namely AES and Present. In fact, the small AES implementation from [GB05]
is also outperformed in all compared metrics, though that implementation is not
protected against SCA. We implemented the higher-order Simon only in parallel
version. As it can be seen, the design is larger than the first-order resistant of Si-
mon. It can also be seen that because of the complex equations for higher order
version the number of LUTs utilized in the design is significantly higher than the
other two designs.
We synthesized the design for ASIC using Synopsys Design Compiler using the
TSMC 90 nm cell library. The results are shown in Table 4.4. The results of the
synthesize tool are divided by 5 (our estimation for the number of gates in each
cell) to give the Gate Equivalents (GE) number. As it can be seen for the case
of Simon128/128 the threshold implementation core is roughly three times bigger
than the unprotected version of the same core. The higher order implementation
core is roughly four times bigger than the unprotected core.
We also compared the performance result with some known ciphers, namely,
AES and Present. The results are shown in Table 4.5 and it can be seen that
even the higher order implementation of Simon is smaller than the threshold im-
plementation for AES. The other small cipher is Katan which accepts plaintext of
size 32, 48 and 64 bits and the key size for all of them is 80 bits.
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Design
Area Max. Freq. Throughput
Slices FFs LUTs (MHz) (Mbps)
Simon32/64
29 29 53 125 6.25
95 81 129 149 5.7
150 109 216 143 4.9
Simon48/72
33 28 58 108 5.0
92 74 135 146 5.5
144 101 227 134 4.5
Simon48/96
39 32 67 99 4.5
106 84 155 134 4.7
161 111 247 121 3.9
Simon64/96
34 28 60 111 4.5
89 74 136 158 5.3
146 102 233 127 3.9
Simon64/128
36 31 64 111 4.2
102 83 150 138 4.3
159 111 248 130 3.7
Simon96/96
43 30 74 101 3.4
107 74 156 138 4.1
167 102 251 140 3.9
Simon96/144
44 30 77 101 3.3
110 76 164 138 3.8
172 104 263 134 3.5
Simon128/128
43 30 78 90 2.4
96 68 150 145 3.5
163 102 265 127 2.9
Simon128/192
48 30 87 88 2.3
110 76 176 149 3.4
169 104 277 138 3.0
Simon128/256
50 33 91 91 2.2
121 85 194 148 3.2
182 113 298 122 2.5
Table 4.1: Implementation result for Simon on Spartan-3. The first row in each
version represents the unprotected Simon the second and third row represent the
threshold implementation and higher order threshold implementation, respectively.
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Design
Area Max. Freq. Throughput
Slices FFs LUTs (MHz) (Mbps)
Simon32/64
51 80 101 364 14.0
103 108 167 366 12.6
Simon48/72
44 74 97 401 15.1
95 102 166 391 13.3
Simon48/96
49 83 104 274 9.7
113 111 170 305 9.9
Simon64/96
52 72 99 277 9.3
101 100 165 350 10.8
Simon64/128
57 81 104 366 11.4
105 109 170 377 10.8
Simon96/96
56 72 109 275 8.3
94 100 179 366 10.2
Simon96/144
51 74 113 318 8.9
93 102 187 336 9.6
Simon128/128
55 71 107 315 7.6
95 99 176 310 7.1
Simon128/192
53 73 116 345 8.0
91 101 187 358 7.8
Simon128/256
60 82 124 346 7.5
100 110 195 359 7.3
Table 4.2: Implementation result for Simon on Kintex-7. The first and second row
in each version represent the threshold implementation and higher order threshold
implementation, respectively
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Design
Area Max. Freq. Throughput
Slices FFs LUTs (MHz) (Mbps)
AES [GB05] 264 N/A N/A 67 2.2
Present [YK09] 117 114 159 113 28.4
Unpro-Simon [AGS14] 36 N/A N/A 136 3.6
TI-Simon
Parallel (area) 96 68 150 145 3.5
Parallel (speed) 108 178 172 191 4.6
Serial (area) 131 94 194 84 0.7
Serial (speed) 137 95 208 110 1
HO TI-Simon
Parallel (area) 163 102 265 127 2.9
Parallel (speed) 167 106 270 149 3.4
Table 4.3: Implementation result on FPGA in comparison to other ciphers with
similar key size. The numbers reported for AES and Present are for unprotected
version of them
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Design Unprotected TI HO-TI
Simon32/64 454 1354 1741
Simon48/72 548 1590 2087
Simon48/96 642 1860 2362
Simon64/96 689 2014 2635
Simon64/128 805 2365 2992
Simon96/96 813 2366 3217
Simon96/144 982 2875 3719
Simon128/128 1039 3044 4122
Simon128/192 1265 3723 4795
Simon128/256 1493 4415 5485
Table 4.4: Implementation result for different implementations of Simon for ASIC.
The reported numbers from the synthesize tool are divided by 5 to give an estimation
for Gate Equivalents (GE) parameter
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Design GE
Unprotected
KATAN-32 [BGN+14b] 1002
Simon48/96 [BSS+13] 763
AES [MPL+11] 2400
Present [BKL+07] 1569
Simon128/128 [BSS+13] 1317
Threshold Implementation
KATAN-32 [BGN+14b] 1720
Simon48/96 [this work] 1860
AES [MPL+11] 11031
AES [BGN+14a] 8171
Simon128/128 [this work] 3044
Higher Order Threshold Implementation
KATAN-32 [BGN+14b] 2556
Simon48/96 [this work] 2362
Simon128/128 [this work] 4122
Table 4.5: Implementation result on ASIC for different ciphers. Katan has key size
of 80 bits, AES and Present have key size of 128 bits
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Chapter 5
Analysis
In this section, we propose a practical attack against the unprotected core of Si-
mon128/128 as defined in [AGS14]. We highlight that, the previous SCA attacks
proposed in [BGDN14] and [SSA14] were developed against the full-state implemen-
tation, and cannot be used against the bit-serialized version of our focus. Then, we
show the results of this attack against the threshold implementation core along with
a thorough leakage detection of the threshold implementation core and higher order
threshold implementation core. We implemented this design in a way that the input
to the core is already in masked form and the random masks are applied from an
external source. Here, we use x(a)b to denote bit number b ∈ [0 : 63] of the word
x : l∨r in round number a ∈ [1 : 68]. x can also denote the key k. The practical test
setup consists of a SASEBO-GII board to develop the hardware design, a Tektronix
DPO-5104 oscilloscope to collect the power traces and a ZFL-1000LN amplifier to
improve resolution of the collected traces.
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5.1 Practical Attacks
The first step in DPA is to identify a sensitive intermediate variable, which depends
on both the input data and the secret key in a non-linear equation with as low
confusion as possible. Linear equations can also work (as used in [BGDN14]), but
the attack in this case will need more traces to distinguish between the correct key
and close-by ones. Low confusion means that the non-linear operation processes a
small number of the key-bits. This is recommended to break the complexity of the
secret key into smaller portions (divide-and-conquer). In this section first we look
at one attack against the unprotected core of Simon and present that performing
the same attack on the threshold implementation of Simon will not work anymore.
Then we will look at one proposal by Beaulieu et al. [BSS+15] and present a valid
way of breaking it.
5.1.1 Attack Against Loop Unrolling
Moradi et al. in [MMP11] presents the results of correlation collision attacks on
different countermeasure including the loop unrolling model. They showed that by
using this countermeasure the number of required traces to attack the algorithm
will increase significantly. The number of traces to attack the unrolled version of
AES will increase from 100,000 to 3,500,000 when the core processes four rounds
per clock cycle instead of one round per clock cycle.
In this work, Simon32/64 is selected as an example to simulate the behaviour of
loop unrolling. Due to the structure of Simon32/64 all the initial key will be used
and there is no need for updating the key.
Let us assume that the unrolled version of Simon maps the plaintext to the data
presented at the fifth round of Simon. Here, we use x(a)b to denote bit number
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b ∈ [0 : 16] of the word x : l ∨ r in round number a ∈ [1 : 32]. We select r(5)0 as a
point to attack. Based on the round function of Simon we just have to write down
the equation of r(5)0 by only using the plaintext and initial key.
The equation for r(5)0 based on the data presented at round four is as follows.
r(5)0 = l(4)0
The bit l(4)0 can be written using the data at round three as following.
l(4)0 = r(3)0 + (l(3)15 × l(3)8) + l(3)14 + k(3)0
The data presented in the above equation can be presented by data at round two
as following.
r(3)0 = l(2)0
l(3)15 = r(2)15 + (l(2)14 × l(2)7) + l(2)13 + k(2)15
l(3)8 = r(2)8 + (l(2)7 × l(2)0) + l(2)6 + k(2)8
l(3)14 = r(2)14 + (l(2)13 × l(2)6) + l(2)12 + k(2)14
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Finally, we can show all the previous data by just using the plaintext at round one.
r(2)15 = l(1)15
r(2)8 = l(1)8
r(2)14 = l(1)14
l(2)0 = r(1)0 + (l(1)15 × l(1)8) + l(1)14 + k(1)0
l(2)14 = r(1)14 + (l(1)13 × l(1)6) + l(1)12 + k(1)14
l(2)7 = r(1)7 + (l(1)6 × l(1)15) + l(1)5 + k(1)7
l(2)13 = r(1)13 + (l(1)12 × l(1)5) + l(1)11 + k(1)13
l(2)6 = r(1)6 + (l(1)5 × l(1)14) + l(1)4 + k(1)6
l(2)12 = r(1)12 + (l(1)11 × l(1)4) + l(1)10 + k(1)12
Now that we show bit r(5)0 can be shown by only data presented at round one, we
can do our attack. As it was mentioned before, the other property of Simon32/64
is that all the key bits presented in the previous equations are also the initial key.
This is not the case with the same unrolled version of Simon128/128 where the key
bits should also be extracted by key schedule function.
For the first simulation, only one bit, i.e., r(5)0 will be saved as power consump-
tion. The result of CPA by using Hamming distance model is shown in Figure 5.1a
and as it can be expected the correlation coefficient is 1 for the correct keys. For the
second simulation we assume more realistic power consumption and that is having
all the 32 bits of data being present in the power traces. The result of the CPA at-
tack by using Hamming distance model is also shown in Figure 5.1b. The correlation
coefficient reduced significantly but the correct key can still be found.
There are more than one correct key in both of the scenarios and the reason is
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Figure 5.1: Attacks against loop unrolling using simulated traces
that in the above equations some of the key bits will appear in a way that the XOR
of two key bits will be in a function. In this case there are two correct key bits. By
doing the CPA attack and iterate over all those 10 key bits presented in the above
equation we could be able to recover 7 bits of the initial key. We can select different
data at round five, i.e., x(5)i and try to extract different key bits each time.
5.1.2 Attack Against Unprotected Core
In order to satisfy the mentioned properties, we focus on attacking the output of the
non-linear operation (the AND gate) in the second round of Simon, where the first
key word k(1) becomes part of l(2) to compute l(3). We do this analysis bit-by-bit
following the bit-serialized implementation. The equation for the first bit of l(3) is:
l(3)0 = r(2)0 + (l(2)63 × l(2)56) + l(2)62 + k(2)0
where
r(2)0 = l(1)0 , and
l(2)i = r(1)i + (l(1)i−1 × l(1)i−8) + l(1)i−2 + k(1)i
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where i ∈ {62, 63, 56} for this particular bit and the subtraction in indexes is done
modulo 64. A similar equation can be written for all the bits of the internal state.
In short, one bit of the left word in round three (e.g. l(3)0) depends non-linearly
on two key-bits (k(1)63 and k(1)56) and linearly on another two key bits (k(2)0 and
k(1)62), along with some input data.
The second step of a successful DPA attack is to select an accurate power model,
which is a function that converts the sensitive intermediate variable into relative
power consumption. In this work, we use the Hamming Distance (HD) power model
which is suitable for hardware modules. The HD represents the number of bit-flips
between two clock cycles. For example, we focus on the activity of the first register
of the left word, representing the operation of overwriting bit l(3)0 by bit l(3)1
between cycle 65 and 66. However, we first need to consider an equation for the
system power consumption.
The system power equation of the unprotected structure (only one share) is:
P = PSRU + PSRD + PFIFO1 + PFIFO2 +N
where PSRU , PSRD, PFIFO1 and PFIFO2 represent the power consumption of the SRU,
the SRD and the FIFO registers, respectively. N is a noise component which repre-
sents the measurement noise along with all on-board activities that do not depend
on the input data including the key-schedule circuit. We did not write a separate
term for the LUT as its effect can be included in its output register, which is the first
register of SRU or SRD depending on the clock cycle (SRU in our example). During
the update of cycle 65/66 and following the HD model, the power consumption of
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each component is:
PSRU = HW
((
l(3)0||r(2)63:55
)⊕ (l(3)1||l(3)0||r(2)63:54))
PSRD + PFIFO1 = HW
(
l(2)1 ⊕ l(2)2)
PFIFO2 = HW
(
|(l(2)0||r(2))|64 ⊕ |(l(2)1||l(2)0||r(2))|64
)
where HW is the Hamming weight function (the number of set-bits), Xs is a circular
shift left by s bits and |x|64 denotes trimming x to the first 64 bits. PSRD + PFIFO1
and PFIFO2 depend linearly on the plaintexts and the bits of k(1). PSRU is the only
component in the system power consumption that depends non-linearly on key bits.
Figure 5.2a and 5.3a give the results of attacking the studied Simon cores with
Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) [BCO04]. In this attack, we used a 4-bit key
hypothesis to represent the non-linear key-bits involved in the computation of l(3)0
and l(3)1. Figures 5.2a and 5.2b show results for attacking the unprotected core.
Figure 5.2a shows the correlation coefficient as a function of time. Figure 5.2b shows
the correlation associated with the correct key against those of the incorrect keys as
the number of analyzed traces increases. Although the results highlight the success
rate of recovering only four bits of the secret key, the remaining key-bits could also
be recovered by selecting another points in the algorithm using the same number of
traces. These results shows that the unprotected core can be broken with less than
1200 traces.
Figures 5.3a and 5.3b show the results of the same attacks against the threshold
implementation core. In this experiment, we collected 500,000 traces of the parallel
version synthesized with speed optimization. If this core passes the attack and the
leakage quantification tests, the serialized version will pass for being designed with
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Figure 5.2: Attack against the unprotected core, key can be extracted from the
implementation
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Figure 5.3: Attack against the threshold implementation core does not work with
as many as 500,000 traces
more conservative assumptions. Although serial version is designed more conserva-
tively one has to make sure that synthesize tool does not combine shares together
which might be the case for MUXes in FPGAs. It is clear that the attack fails to
recover any secret key, which supports our claim of secrecy.
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5.2 Leakage Detection
Although the attack mentioned in Section 5.1.2 is necessary to prove the SCA-
security of the proposed module, the attack examines the leakage of a single point
in the trace which is not sufficient. The way to attack the threshold implementation
core is either by proposing a more complex key extraction attack or using other
generic methods to detect a leakage. The leakage detection technique examines the
entire trace searching for any point where the leakage can be distinguished from
random noise. Here, we do not use any key-recovery attack, but we use statistical
tools to prove the indistinguishably of the collected traces. These tests are stronger
than the previous DPA attack, as they search for the distinguishability in any trace
point that may or may not lead to a full key recovery.
We use the test suite developed in [GJJR11]. This work was mainly proposed
to satisfy two needs for such a detection methods. Firstly, there should be some
clear parameter in order to pass or reject a device. Secondly, The should be done in
an easy manner without the need for sophisticated attacks.This work gained a lot
of attention recently and it was also used in [LMW14, BGN+14b] to evaluate the
effectiveness of their countermeasures.
The concept of the test is to gather some measurements and partitioned them into
two group. Based on those measurements are obtained the partitioning method is
going to be different. The measurements can be obtained from the set of randomly
varying plaintext and the test based on that is called Random Versus Random
(RVR). It can also be based on a fixed plaintext and randomly varying plaintext
which is called Fixed Versus Random (FVR). The null hypothesis means that those
two set have similar means and variance. The other hypothesize is that the mean of
the two sets is different. The t-test performs the evaluation of the null hypothesize
61
and determines with a confidence level whether two sets of measurement are from
same distribution or not.
As it was mentioned the FVR test depends on collecting two sets of leakage
traces, one with a fixed plaintext while the other with randomly varying plaintexts.
The traces are collected in an interleaved way to minimize the effect of noise. We
compute the sample mean (µ) and sample standard deviation (σ) of the traces in
each set. Then, we compute the result of Welchs t-test:
t =
µa − µb√
(σ2a/Na) + (σ
2
b/Nb)
where a and b denote the two sets and Ni denote the number of traces in set i : a∨b.
The device fails the FVR test if the value of t exceeds a certain threshold. This
threshold corresponds directly to the confidence level which was mentioned before.
It is shown in [SM15] that if two sets of measurements have approximately equal
number of traces and similar variance by choosing ±4.5 as a threshold the confidence
level is going to be %99.999. This threshold, i.e. ±4.5, is also used in [GJJR11]
and [LMW14].
The RVR test applies the same analysis as above however, all the traces are
collected with randomly varying plaintexts. In this case, the two groups of traces
are separated based on an intermediate variable. We apply the RVR test to the HD
between the first bits of the left and right words of the first two rounds.
Figure 5.4a and 5.4b report results of the FVR and the RVR tests for the un-
protected core at 100,000 traces, respectively. Figures 5.5a and 5.5b report results
for the threshold implementation core at 2,000,000 traces. We applied the afore-
mentioned RVR tests and report results of only one intermediate variable (the HD
in the first register during cycle 65/66). The unprotected core failed all the leakage
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Figure 5.4: Results of leakage detection for unprotected core using 500,000 traces
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Figure 5.5: Results of leakage detection for threshold implementation core using
2,000,000 traces
quantification tests (as expected), while the threshold implementation core did pass
all the tests which again supports our claim of secrecy.
These tests can also be applied for higher order analysis but they require pre-
processing before the statistical test. To perform higher order test the traces should
be mean-free squared. Let us denote the random variable of the power traces with X
and as it was stated we use µ and σ as sample mean and sample standard deviation,
respectively.
In order to analyze second-order evaluations we use (X−µ)2 and for orders more
than 2 we use (X−µ
σ
)d. The natural way of computing the higher-order analysis is
by processing traces twice. First time to compute the mean and the second time to
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calculate the mean-free traces. This model of analysis can be quite time consuming
since all the traces should be processed even if the device fails for rather small
number of traces. Schneider and Moradi in [SM15] introduced a way to compute
the mean-free traces in a one pass manner so that early exit from the analysis is
possible if the leakage is found in the early stages. This method can be done while
the traces are being collected so some overheads such as analysis time and some
other delays regarding to saving traces in memory will be reduced.
We gathered 20 million traces for the threshold implementation core as well as
higher order threshold implementation core. The traces are for the first four round
of Simon. As it can be seen in Figure 5.6 the threshold implementation of Simon
leaks at second order analysis while being resistant against first order analysis. The
number of traces are not sufficient to observe third and fourth order leakages.
As it was mentioned we gathered 20 million traces for the first four round of
Simon. It can be seen in Figure 5.7 that the higher order threshold implementation
of Simon does not leak at second order analysis as well as being resistant against
first order analysis. The number of traces are not sufficient to observe third and
fourth order leakages.
It is important to have an estimation on how many traces we need in order to
detect higher order leakage. Figure 5.8 represents the progress of second order t-
test value for one point throughout the measurements. As it can be seen, around
10 million traces the implementation starts to leak. Bilgin et al. [BGN+14b] also
presented the higher order analysis, in their paper they were able to detect fifth order
leakages for 300 million traces while there was no evidence of third order leakage.
The analysis of the higher order threshold implementation of Simon in order to see
third order leakage should be performed with more than just 20 million traces which
is beyond the scope of this work. Another open problem is to estimate the number
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Figure 5.6: Leakage detection result for threshold implementation core for the first
four round of Simon using 20,000,000 traces
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Figure 5.7: Leakage detection result for higher order threshold implementation core
for the first four round of Simon using 20,000,000 traces
66
0 5 10 15
x 106
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Number of Measurement
M
ax
im
um
 t−
te
st
 V
al
ue
Figure 5.8: Progress of t-test value over 15 million traces for one point throughout
the measurements
of required traces to be able to detect higher order leakages.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this work, we presented possible ways of protecting an implementation of a cryp-
tographic cipher. Threshold implementation as a possible way of achieving this goal
is introduced. We proposed a threshold implementation of Simon block cipher that
can be implemented in less than 100 slices of a low-cost FPGA platform. The thor-
ough leakage detection for the threshold implementation of Simon is also presented.
We showed that the threshold implementation of Simon is secure against first order
attacks, but it is vulnerable against second order attacks. To fix the vulnerability
against second order attacks, higher order threshold implementation of Simon is
introduced. We gathered 20 million measurement for this core and presented its
resistance against first order and second order attacks. Our future work will be fo-
cused on the analysis of higher order threshold implementations with more number
of measurements.
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